The Semiperipheral Space in the World-System

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Bridging the divides between the social sciences is a central theme in Wallerstein's work. By analyzing the genesis and working of our present world-system he has shown the relevancy of such an integrative approach. Geography benefited from his analysis of the changing spatial organization of the world. It clarifies how the expanding world-system incorporated new regions and intensifies its influence over local developments. Also the analysis of the changing positions in the world-system due to systematic cycles and local circumstances increase our understanding of the changing geography of the world. However, the geographical relevance of the world-systems approach contrasts with the ephemeral position of geographical factors in the analysis of the changing world-system as a whole. Geography is sometimes used to explain specific events. For instance the proximity to crucial trade routes is identified by Wallerstein as an important factor behind Sweden's semiperipheral development in the seventeenth century (Wallerstein, 1980a: 217–18). However, geographical factors are not included in the discussion analysis of semiperipheral development in general.

This article confronts Wallerstein's conceptualization of space with a geographical one. A discussion of the general abstract concept of space by Wallerstein and in geography is followed by a more substantial review of the semiperiphery.

TIMESPACE AND SOCIAL SPACE

Timespace is a concept Wallerstein uses to address the relation with geography (Wallerstein, 1988; 1998). Social sciences have been dominated too long by the search for natural laws of behavior irre-
spective of time and space. Still, these diverge between periods and locations. Braudel (1972) originated the breaking up of uniform time. In his opposition to the limitation of history to the chronicle of events, Braudel distinguished different forms of time. Braudel wanted more attention to the long-term perspective of the slow changing structures. These structures have different spatial structures, with different networks and different cores (Braudel, 1986).

Wallerstein builds on this by distinguishing TimeSpaces with different duration and scope. The most visible are the episodic TimeSpaces of specific events which can be located in a specific place, such as the invasion of Grenada by the United States in 1983. These episodes not only have a dynamic of their own, but take place within other TimeSpaces. The cyclical-ideological TimeSpace contains longer lasting divisions like those between East and West during the Cold War and between North and South during decolonization. The development of whole world-systems takes place within the structural TimeSpace. Expanding borders and a spatial structure divided between core and periphery characterize these geographically. These structures are persistent despite changes in the positions of individual regions in the world-system which take place in the cyclical-ideological TimeSpace. Transformational TimeSpace are those unique occurrences at the right time and place when one structural TimeSpace is succeeded by another. This is the rare moment when free will can determine the organization of society. This window of opportunity for voluntary action contrasts sharply with unchanging eternal TimeSpace. These aspects of human behavior are inherent in nature and are timeless and spaceless. Social sciences have too long been preoccupied by unsuccessfully trying to explain social developments from this eternal TimeSpace. The more limited and less mechanical other TimeSpaces were disregarded.

Wallerstein's main concern is the difference in the extent of social processes. In his conceptualization of space he overemphasizes the scope of social processes and neglects the spatial structures and spatial processes within that scope. This is related to Wallerstein's original search for a meaningful unit of analysis to study fundamental social change. After rejecting the nation-state, Wallerstein regards the historical social system they are part of as the only useful unit of analysis to study structural social change (1974: 7). The very abstract and large scale space of the world-system as a whole is Wallerstein's starting point. Although the extensive attention to the processes
behind core-periphery divisions considerably specify this abstract conceptualization of space, this stops well short of systematic attention to the concrete material organization of space.

Although especially in his empirical analyses Wallerstein uses different aspects of space, Wallerstein's dominant conceptualization of space is that of an amorphous expanse. Space is a sterile arena in which social actors and factors operate. But space is not inert. Social processes transform its structure and the location of meaningful objects and people in space have important social consequences. Wallerstein's differentiation between different eras and scopes should be elaborated by distinguishing between different forms of space. Space is not as straightforward as it seems. The exact projection of the earth surface in maps shows only one aspect of the space studied by geographers.

Läpple (1992) has systemized these different conceptions of space. The social importance of space is crucial for him. The failure in the social sciences to formulate general laws independent from time and space has only resulted in accepting time as an important social category. This is also the starting point of Wallerstein's Time-Spaces. Whereas time is no longer seen as given by nature, space is still regarded as external to society. Space is still primarily regarded as a non-social category which hinders interaction. The improvements in communication have destroyed this old terror of distance, enabling societies to enter the brave new era of globalization. However, the shrinking of distance does not invalidate geography. Only physical space is the victim of the communication revolution. Läpple finds this empty and uniform space suited for mathematics and not for human geography. Space cannot be reduced to sterile distances. Socially relevant space is structured from four different archetypes of space: structured material space; social economic space; political space; and cultural space. These form a spatial matrix behind the different conceptions of space in geography.

The basis for all human activities is the physical material substrate which creates a structured material space. Nature gives opportunities to humans to use and transform the natural landscape. This form of space is not restricted to ecology, but incorporates also land use patterns and the location of human artifacts. For example, spatial infrastructure for society in the form of bridges and roads results from the interaction between physical givens and human use, thus creating the backbone for all human actions. The social use of
this material substrate not only transforms the structured material space, but creates also a social economic space. The production relations create divergent class interests of people in different regions and locations. The political space with its institutionalized normative regulation system connects the first two forms of social spaces. This clearly delimited space is based on the juridical regulations of social relations and land use. A fourth form of social space is a cultural space based on symbolic representations. Areas are also objects of identification. The collective memory of the population is a potent source for regional cohesion (Läpple, 1992: 196–97).

Besides these four archetypes of space, several other factors are fundamental in the understanding of regions (Läpple, 1992: 198–201). The time dimension is crucial because social development changes all regions. Not only the position towards other regions, but also the structure within a region changes constantly. This regional development is more cyclical than constant and more contradictory than the simple spread of development. Regions also differ in the scale of their scope. The combination of time, scale, and the different archetypes of space mold different types of regions whose borders seldom overlap.

These abstract forms of social space can be connected to developments at different scales and periods within the world-system. The semiperiphery shows the importance of different forms of space in the world-system. Geography can contribute in understanding the diversity in the semiperiphery. Geography is helpful in understanding its dynamic nature at different spatial scales.

THE SEMIPERIPHERY AS A SOCIAL CATEGORY

The semiperiphery as an extra category besides core and periphery is an important innovation of the world-systems approach. Development theories are traditionally based on examples of development. Marx concentrated on nineteenth-century England and Rostow on twentieth-century United States. Besides these mainstream evolutionary theories, there emerged in the last decades a series of theories focusing on factors hindering development in the periphery. We find this tendency in the study of countries in a world context and in the study of regions in a country. Theories on regional development and regional underdevelopment are largely based on
ideal typical core and peripheral regions. This is an appropriate strategy for developing elegant general theories. Thinking in clear polarized types is quite attractive, but leads to theories that are based on only small and very biased samples. This is unfortunate, because clear examples of development and underdevelopment are quite rare. The countries and regions in the middle are mostly studied as deviating from or conforming to the general core pattern or as breaking through the peripheral constraints to development. Wallerstein is one of the few to give explicit theoretical attention to the semiperiphery.

*The Semiperiphery as a Blurred Group*

Despite its importance for understanding development, it is difficult to determine what constitutes the semiperiphery. Many authors working from within the world-systems perspective have identified semiperipheral states. Interestingly, they all found the semiperiphery they were looking for, but they differed widely in which states they identified as semiperipheral. Almost every state is considered as semiperipheral. Only the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and most of the states south of the Sahara are never regarded as semiperipheral. Remarkably, no single state is classified as semiperipheral by all. Although the ordering of states from core to periphery is quite uniform, the borders between core and semiperiphery and between semiperiphery and periphery are drawn at different places (Terlouw, 1992: 30–48).

The semiperiphery is not a distinct group of states that can be separated from the core and the periphery. It is an intermediate zone on the continuum between core and periphery. Elsewhere I showed that Algeria, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Venezuela are the states closest to the middle of the continuum between core and periphery in 1985 (Terlouw, 1993). It is important to bear in mind that semiperipheral states can have diverse characteristics that averaged give them an intermediate position. The semiperiphery with a strong political position in the world-system includes Indonesia, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, and South Korea, while for New Zealand and Ireland semiperipheral position is more economically based. The states that have the most uniform average scores on all characteristics used for the core-periphery continuum are Mexico, Colombia, Hungary, Greece, Israel, Iran, and South Africa.
Semiperipheral states have no distinct features that separate them from core and periphery. The boundaries towards the core and the periphery are vague, and the foundations of the semiperipheral position are diverse. The semiperiphery is not a clearly delimited zone that can be fixed on a map. The semiperiphery appears as an amorphous group overlapping with the more distinct core and periphery when one compares characteristics of members of the semiperiphery. The social structure within each semiperiphery is much clearer. The average position in the world-system results in an extremely stressed social structure in the semiperiphery creating strong differences in development.

The Distinct Semiperipheral Social Structure

According to Wallerstein the world-system operates through two types of exploitation. First, the periphery is exploited by the core. The semiperiphery occupies an intermediate position in this exploitation. Secondly, the proletariat is exploited by the bourgeoisie. These two types of exploitation are also connected. The exploitation of the periphery by the core is made possible by the lesser remuneration of the workers in the periphery. The low wages in the periphery are rooted in a different household structure in the periphery. The households in the periphery are more self-sufficient than the households in the core. A household in the periphery supplements its income from nonmarket sources. Wallerstein calls these semiproletarian. This category consists of households whose members occasionally work for wages, and other independent producers, such as peasants who sell a part of their produce on the (world)market and consume the rest. The semiproletariat is most numerous in the periphery, whereas in the core the proletarian household is the dominant form. In a proletarian household both production and consumption are commercialized. Wages are not one, but the only source of income for a proletarian household. Although the collective struggle of the workers in the core results in relatively high wages, the remuneration paid to the semiproletarians in the periphery can also be lower, because they have alternative sources of income (Wallerstein et al., 1982: 437–40).

Figure 1 displays the structure of exploitation in the world-system. The rectangle represents the population in the world-system, which is divided over different classes and over different zones. The
slopes of the lines dividing the different classes indicates that these social and geographical divisions are related. The many semiproletarians in the periphery enable the exploitation of the periphery by the core. This unequal exchange between core and periphery, combined with the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, results in a concentration of value in the upper left corner in figure 1. This double exploitation not only makes the world-system function, but also generates tensions. However, the complex structure of exploitation in the world-system makes it difficult for the disadvantaged to unite. The partly overlapping modes of exploitation in the world-system result in different social contradictions in different positions in the world-system.

**Figure 1**
The World-System Fragments the Social Structure of the Semiperiphery

In the core, the relationship between bourgeoisie and proletariat is the main source of social conflict. However, this conflict is pacified by the redistribution of surplus extracted from the (semi)periphery. The wealth of a core state makes it possible to appease the discontent of its proletariat through the creation of a redistributive welfare
state. Almost everybody in a core state profits from the working of the world-system.

In the periphery the situation is completely different. The vast majority of the population is semiproletarian. Consequently, the main source of tensions is the exploitation by the core from which almost the entire population suffers. Only the small “comprador” bourgeoisie profits from the exploitation of the periphery by the core. Social tensions in peripheral states are far stronger than in core states. Because of the lack in economical, political, military, and organizational strength, these tensions smoulder beneath the surface. Peripheral states are too weak to oppose the exploitation by the core states.

In the semiperiphery tensions flare up more often into vigorous conflict. This is partly because semiperipheral societies are stronger. Their economic, political, military, and organizational resources are more developed. These tensions fuel sustained conflicts. Compared with the periphery, the semiperiphery not only has more opportunities to express the tensions generated by the world-system, it is also exposed to more tensions. The class structure in the semiperiphery is far more complicated than in either core or periphery. Figure 1 shows that the semiperiphery has three important social classes. In a semiperipheral state the resistance from the proletariat to the exploitation by the bourgeoisie is complicated by the fact that both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat profit from the exploitation of the large semiproletariat. The social tensions in the semiperiphery are further intensified by exploitation by the core. The intermediate position in the exploitation of the periphery by the core complicates the class structure of the semiperiphery. For example the bourgeoisie can be split between a faction whose interests are connected to the core and a nationalistic faction opposed to exploitation by the core. The stressed social structure of the semiperiphery makes it prone to ethnically colored conflicts within its borders. The transformation of semiproletarians into proletarians is especially stressful. Being forced to give up their old way of life based on subsistence production under their own control frequently leads to a political backlash that uses the traditional ethnic divisions within a state to mobilize its participants.

These multiple sources of tension result in a level of social conflict in the semiperiphery that is generally much higher than in either core or periphery (Chase-Dunn, 1988: 60). The intermediate position between core and periphery results in an outstanding vio-
lent mixture of social tensions. Different semiperipheral states differ wildly in how these conflicts are expressed. This results in a further differentiation of the semiperiphery. The semiperiphery is not only heterogenous in the different aspects of its position in the world-system but is also heterogeneous in its responses to that position. The semiperiphery is a pressure ridge between core and periphery. The concept semiperiphery is useful in describing and analyzing the pressures from the world-system, but belonging to the semiperiphery does not determine the local responses to these general pressures. From world-system theory one can deduct that the social structure of the semiperiphery is much more stressed by forces of the world-system than either core or periphery. How this stress presents itself in a specific semiperiphery is not determined. States which have a semiperipheral position in the world-system and which experience similar pressures from the world-system can have very different political regimes. For example, in Australia the pressures from the labor movement were resolved in the 1930's through arbitration, while Argentina used repression (Alexander, 1989).

THE CHANGING SEMIPERIPHERY

The semiperiphery is not only an arena of conflicting forces within its borders. It is also subjected to external pressures which give them potential not only for development, but also for destructive conflicts.

The Dynamic Semiperiphery

Not only its internal social structure, but also its intermediate position in the world-system make the semiperiphery the most dynamic part of the world-system. Its political economic power is, unlike the core, insufficient to regulate the world market successfully, but unlike the periphery, it has some resources for influencing it. The privileged position of the core makes actors fat and complacent. The semiperipheral position makes its actors more "lean and mean." This resembles Pareto's (1991) circulating elites on a world scale. The semiperiphery maximizes the need and necessity for regional development. Figure 2 illustrates how this motivates actors within the semiperiphery.
This general semiperipheral potential for development is only periodically realized by a minority of semiperipheries. Crisis in the Kondratieff-like economic long waves give opportunities to the semiperiphery. These interruptions in the development of new industries in the core stimulate the quick redeployment of industries to low-cost areas. Labor costs are the most visible cause of this global redi- vision of labor, but other, more hidden production costs, like government regulations and transportation costs are also important. In many core states institutional sclerosis and congestion stifle development, while in the periphery the absence of good government, services, and skilled labor hampers development. Many semiperipheral states and communities have enough regulation of economy and society for capitalism to flourish, but not too much regulation that would stifle the market. Only some semiperipheries can transform this temporary advantage into a promotion to the core (Wallerstein & Hopkins, 1977; Wallerstein et al., 1982; Wallerstein, 1976; 1979; 1981; Olson, 1982).

Its internal structure and international position frequently enable the semiperiphery to improve its position in the world-system during economic stagnation. In the relations between states, the activism of
the semiperiphery due to its position in the world-system between core and periphery makes it liable to start wars. The energy potential the world-system generates in the semiperiphery can release itself in a destructive way, or it can be used constructively to improve the position of the semiperiphery in the world-system. The rise of South Korea and Singapore in the last decades contrast sharply with the decline of Venezuela, Hungary, and Argentina (Terlouw, 1992).

**The Developing Semiperiphery**

This general dynamic potential of the semiperiphery is not only cyclically induced, but must be realized in specific semiperipheries. The different reasons behind individual development of semiperipheries are beyond the scope of the present argument, but the pattern these individual developments generate is quite interesting. Wallerstein suggests much mobility between the different positions in the world-system. "Actors swap roles. What does not happen is that everyone becomes richer. Only some do, and even then always at someone else's expense" (Wallerstein, 1980b: 639). According to this zero-sum perspective on mobility, decline from core to semiperiphery and from semiperiphery to periphery should be as common as ascent from periphery to semiperiphery and from semiperiphery to core.

Figure 3 sketches the general pattern of mobility in the world-system as it emerges from the many scattered remarks by Wallerstein on individual and groups of states (Terlouw, 1985: 42–46). The white areas are those which still belonged to the periphery in 1980. For instance, Peru has always belonged to the periphery, while Nigeria, which was in 1700 outside the world-system, was incorporated in its periphery by 1900 and had achieved a semiperipheral position by 1980. Areas with the lightest grey became semiperipheral only in the twentieth century. Portugal and most of Spain, the area with the darkest grey, have always belonged to the semiperiphery. These are the exceptions. Most older semiperipheries had achieved core position by 1900, like Germany and the United States, or by 1980, like Sweden and northern Italy. The Netherlands in 1900 and the German Democratic Republic in 1980 are the only two examples of temporary decline in position in the world-system. Figure 3 makes clear that the boundaries between the different positions in the world-system are frequently crossed, but only in one direction. The dominant path of development is external arena, periphery, semiperiphery, core.
Figure 3

Mobility in the Modern World-System

Approximate boundaries of the world-system in 1700
Figure 4 depicts the general development of core, semiperiphery, and periphery within the expanding world-system. This combines the above identified evolutionary developmental path of individual regions with the general polarization between different positions in the world-system. It shows the more or less uniform starting positions after the Middle Ages. The exploitation of the periphery by the core augmented these initially small differences in the unfolding world-system.

Thus if, at a given moment in time, because of a series of factors at a previous time, one region has a slight edge over another in terms of one key factor, and there is a conjuncture of events which make this slight edge of central importance in terms of determining social action, then the slight edge is converted into a large disparity and the advantage holds even after the conjuncture has passed. This was the case in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe ... the slight edge of the fifteenth century became the great disparity of the seventeenth and the monumental difference of the nineteenth (Wallerstein, 1974: 98–99).

Figure 4 is a too smooth representation of development in the world-system. Not only is the incorporation of external arena’s less
gradual, but more important, the individual developmental paths are much less evolutionary. For example, the semiperiphery houses longstanding stagnating states like Portugal, strong growers like Mexico and South Korea, which up until recently belonged to the periphery, and states whose initial thrust of semiperipheral development has stalled, like South Africa, or has been reversed, like Argentina and Russia.

THE SEMIPERIPHERY AT DIFFERENT SPATIAL SCALES

The diversity of the semiperiphery masks the importance of semiperipheral development for the world-system. To understand the basic processes behind this semiperipheral development it is important to realize that semiperipheral development occurs at different spatial scales. The argument has focussed up until now on semiperipheral states within the world-system. But semiperipheral development is not restricted to this scale where the social economic and to a lesser extent the political form of space dominates. Not only is the world-system the result of semiperipheral political development, but semiperipheral development is also important on the subnational regional scale. At this scale, the general aspects of semiperipheral development frequently take a form where the structured material space appears to dominate, but in fact integrates the different forms of social space.

The Semiperipheral Origins of the World-System

The first world-system was the result of semiperipheral development. After the agricultural revolution in Mesopotamia, a mosaic of autonomous city-states emerged. Each city exploited its surrounding countryside. These city-states were largely self-reliant economically. The political links were more important, but had a limited spatial extension, mostly limited to occasional quarrels between direct neighbors. These relations were not extensive and intensive enough to create a world-system. Akkad was located at the margins of this landscape of city-states and late in developing a sedentary city-state. It compensated its economic difficulties by a political innovation. It combined the elitist high organizational skills of the city-state with the nomadic way of warfare based on mass mobilization. This innovation, combined with the exhaustion through mutual warfare and
internal social conflicts of the central city-states, made it possible for Akkad to conquer all other city-states. Because this marcher state transformed this conquest into a durable system based on politically enforced tribute payments, it created the first world-system (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997: 85–89).

Many other world-systems developed later. Each of the ancient civilizations, such as Egypt, Greece, the Roman and the Chinese empires, organized its own world-system. These world-systems did not develop in complete isolation from each other. The cycle of rise and demise of regional world-systems was definitely broken in the nineteenth century when our present world-system succeeded in incorporating all other world-systems. The semiperipheral innovation of the European world-system was partly induced by the friction with other world-systems. The opposition of the Ottoman Empire to the attempts by the Habsburgs to unify politically the emergent European world-system was successful in the short term, but led to its demise in the long term. The semiperipheral innovation of the European world-system that gave it its dynamic thrust was the institutionalized rivalry between states. Paradoxically, political fragmentation enabled the European entrepreneurs to develop trade relations and build an integrated world-economy. The states needed the financial support of the entrepreneurs to be successful in the competition with other states. This gave the economy the necessary relative autonomy and flexibility to develop. Institutionalized rivalry also strengthened the states. Over time, this political military strength of the states in the European world-system enabled them to subjugate ever more rival world-systems. Only after the modern world-system subjugated and incorporated all other world-systems, did a significant gap in economic development and wealth between the European core and the rest of the world develop (Abu Lughod, 1989; 1990; Frank, 1998; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997; Tilly, 1990). The transformation of the political space preceded the metamorphosis of the social economic space.

The Semiperiphery within the World-System

The semiperipheral development of the European world-system towards other world-systems was also helped by the existence of an important semiperiphery within the European world-system. The present world-system is not only divided into many different states, but also into many different political economic zones. The semiperiphery depolarizes the relation between core and periphery.
Exploited communities will always be divided and unable to unite to overthrow the world-system, because the strongest among them—the semiperiphery—profit from the exploitation of the periphery (Wallerstein, 1974: 348-50; Wallerstein & Hopkins, 1977: 129). The semiperiphery is also appeased by the possibility to join the core. Most of the present core states, like the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and Japan, belonged in the past to the semiperiphery.

The Spatial Position of Semiperipheries within the World-System

Semiperipheries exhibit differences in spatial structure. These include differences in their context and their regional differentiation. Figure 5a-g depicts the most basic spatial differences between semiperipheries. Figure 5a depicts the semiperiphery only as a distinct socioeconomic category, having an intermediate degree of development. This can be the result of fundamental differences in their internal structural (figure 5a-d) and external position (figure 5e-g). A semiperiphery is not necessarily spatially homogeneous as depicted in figure 5a. Its internal structure can be heterogeneous as depicted in figure 5b. This heterogeneity can occur because the semiperiphery has a concentration of core activities in one part and peripheral activities elsewhere, for example, Mexico. The size of the semiperipheries also differs. For some semiperipheries, like India and China, the mass of population is decisive (figure 5c), while high densities characterize small semiperipheral states such as Singapore and Hong Kong (figure 5d). Location toward core regions further differentiates between semiperipheries. Some are close to core regions, such as Mexico recently and Sweden in the seventeenth century, and develop due to spread effects from the core (figure 5e). Not just distance, but also position differentiates the semiperiphery. Some semiperipheries are local centers in a generally peripheral area such as South Africa (figure 5f). Others profit from their intermediate position between cores, as do Ireland now and The Netherlands at the end of the nineteenth century (figure 5g). More frequent are the intermediate semiperipheries between urban cores within a state.

The importance of different forms of space for understanding semiperipheral development is even greater for regions within states. Spatial sorting mechanisms are more important and visible, where the scale is more in agreement with the scope of human
Figure 5
Spatial Differences Between Semiperipherics

5 a  Homogeneity

5 b  Heterogeneity

5 c  Large and sparse

5 d  Small and dense

5 e  Proximity to core

5 f  Local center

5 g  Intermediate position
actors. On this scale level within a state, much of the social, economic, and political is a constant context. Spatial processes become more important at this scale level. This type of a semiperipheral region is primarily based on its intermediate geographical location.

The Corridor Region as Arena of Semiperipheral Spatial Forces

This general external intermediate position as depicted in figure 5g also influences the internal regional structure. Frequently the external interaction is focused on an axial infrastructure. Figure 6 depicts such a corridor region. All regions are connected to the world-system, but the regional structure and development of corridor regions are molded by the physical connections with developmental centers outside the corridor region. This enables corridor regions to profit from the stagnation of these local cores. The social economic crisis of the city, with its traffic congestion, soaring local taxes and social costs, lack of affordable locations for new businesses and housing, revitalizes parts of the countryside. New businesses prefer good accessible greenfield locations outside the congested core, creating corridors of development along the major infrastructure (Taaffe et al., 1992; Molle et al., 1998). This creates a regional differentiation within the corridor region. Development first concentrates along the infrastructure, especially at locations close to the cores and near local centers. The zone close to the core benefits first from the positive spread effects. These backyards of the cores in the semiperiphery develop, pulling them away from their local center. The zones further away suffer, at least at first, negative backwash effects, such as migration towards the core. This weakening cohesion can be reversed when the local center succeeds in developing.

The corridor region faces problems in different forms of spaces. This is representative of the general divergent forces operating in semiperipheries. Its material space is not necessarily structured along a clear axis as depicted in figure 6. The preexisting material space of a region does not necessarily concentrate the infrastructure, as a valley or a train of cities would do. The fanning out of infrastructures hinders developments by undermining the possibilities for local control. It results in a more complex division of the territory and strengthens the position of those who only want to parasitize on the external controlled circulation (Bavoux, 1993). Fragmentation of the physical infrastructure also fragments the political space. The spatial cleavages a corridor region faces are not only located within
the region, but also depend on the relation with its context. The polarization between the corridor region and its adjacent cores is a spatial semiperipheral force from a higher scale that tears the region apart. Not only the social economic and political orientation to a specific core of the adjacent parts within the corridor region disintegrates the region. Also, in the more elusive cultural space, the corridor region is an arena of opposing semiperipheral forces. The collective memory of the population and its symbolic regional images are a source for regional cohesion. The corridor developments not only change the structural material space, but also undermine this regional image. For instance, the cognitive dissonance between images of plain peasants living in unspoiled countrysides can be too strong, when confronted with an industrializing corridor. However, the inhabitants also change. Some remain committed to the old region, while others become orientated towards the cores. More visible are the migrants from the cores into the corridor region. In the power struggle between established and outsiders the traditional inhabitants frequently lose control in localities within the corridor region, enhancing the problems of coherent regulation for the corridor region as a whole.

The corridor region is an inherently unstable region. Like the semiperiphery in general, it is a transitional phase in development. When local control fails to develop, it is carved up by the adjacent
cores. On the other hand, when a corridor region develops, the polarization with its surrounding cores diminishes, and all become part of a larger integrated polynuclear regional system.

CONCLUSION

The world-systems approach uses geography to explain specific developments in the world-system, but hardly considers the role of space in the general analysis of the world-system. Wallerstein's discussion of the different, but related TimeSpaces is an interesting opening to strengthen the relationship with geography. However, the space concept that lies behind Wallerstein's different TimeSpaces has more to do with different scopes and scales of behavior than with structured social space. The discussion of the semiperiphery showed the compatibility of the world-systems approach with geography in practice. Especially at the lowest spatial scale geography contributes to the understanding of semiperipheral development.

The review of the semiperiphery shows that hanging in the balance between core and peripheral forces creates great diversity. The semiperiphery is an arena where contrary forces of comparable strength cause diverse developments. We find this semiperipheral pressure cooker at different times and scales in all different forms of space. In the transformational TimeSpace semiperipheral development can break a centuries long political standoff between world-systems. In the structural TimeSpace we have seen the general spread of political and social economic development in the world-system, enabling the semiperiphery to develop. This is not constant but fluctuates in long economic waves. The social economic crisis in the cyclico-ideological TimeSpace accelerates the spreading effects. During an economic downswing the development of new industries stagnates in the old core. After some time the economic upswing occurs as new industries develop. These are usually concentrated in formerly semiperipheral locations. These locations form the structured material space of the episodic TimeSpace. At the scale of the world-system these are for instance nineteenth-century Germany and twentieth-century Japan. Also at former semiperipheral locations within the old core states new industries are set up. The revival of long term economic growth in the United States has shifted the center of gravity from the Northwest to the South and East. In Germany
the shift is from the Ruhr area to the South, in France from the North to the South, and in Italy from the North to the middle. This relocation at this intrastate level has not only to do with general social economic factors, but also depends on spatial processes, such as those discussed in the section on the corridor region. The destruction of distance by the recent communications revolution facilitated social and economic interaction to take place outside the Fordist agglomerations. This destruction of physical space creates new social spaces, in corridor regions.

REFERENCES


