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Protestantism Is Not What Matters.
On Protestant Identity and a Soul For Europe

1. The identity of Europe

Recent developments in European politics, until the recent 'Brexit' vote in the United Kingdom (June 2016), all point at the fact that Europe cannot function only as a bunch of political and economical appointments. There should be an underlying European identity that governs the making of decisions. However, is such an identity possible and what is needed for the identity of Europe? I intend to approach this question on a philosophical-theological meta-level, by considering the notion of identity. But ultimately, my horizon of reflection is Protestant theology, so we should also add the theme of Protestantism to our reflection.

Given this perspective, I start with the wish of Jacques Delors, who considered the quest for Europe´s identity as a spiritual task (§ 2). Then I use the hermeneutical philosophy of Paul Ricoeur to investigate the notion of identity in general (§ 3) and I add to Ricoeur´s hermeneutical approach the analytical criticism of Derek Parfit (§ 4). I conclude with a turn to Protestant identity in regard to Europe, as a specific application of our philosophical search (§ 5).

2. A Soul for Europe

The theme of this volume, 'Protestant Traditions and the Soul of Europe', reminds us of a speech of the former president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, who was intensely involved in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that created the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty laid the basis for a common European market and a future common European currency unit. However, Delors envisaged that, in order to create a real sense of Europe, more was needed than common markets and political-economic agreements. In a speech to the Conference of European Churches in February 1992 he said:

> We are now entering a fascinating time – perhaps especially for the young generation – a time when the debate on the meaning of European construction becomes a major political factor. Believe me, we will not succeed with Europe solely on the basis of legal expertise or economic know-how. It is impossible to put the potential of Maastricht into practice without a breath of air. If in the next ten years we have not managed to give a soul to Europe, to give a spirituality and meaning, the game will be up. (…) This is why I want to revive the intellectual and spiritual debate on Europe. I invite the Churches to participate actively in it. We do not want to control it; it is a

democratic discussion, not to be monopolised by technocrats. I would like to create a meeting place, a space for free discussion open to men and women of spirituality, to believers and non-believers, scientists and artists. We are working on the idea already. We must find a way of involving the Churches.[1]

This invitation of Delors could be regarded as the starting point of a search for a common European mind-set. In order to make Europe a lasting entity more than legal expertise and economic know-how is needed. Europe needs a soul, an inner centre of inspiration. And for this soul an intellectual and spiritual debate is needed, in which the churches, equipped with a centuries-old tradition of speaking about the soul, are invited to participate.

It must have been a pleasant surprise for the churches, often ignored in the cultural and political debate, to be explicitly invited to this debate, as a kind of recognition of their appearance in society. However, theologians should be cautious to accept Delors' invitation. There are some critical remarks that I want to make around this quotation for anyone who would embrace his plea as a theological task all too quickly. I arrive at five aspects that should be taken into account, when considering the idea of a soul for Europe.

First, I remark that this soul for Europe apparently is, at least for Delors, not a given entity but rather a task that stands out to be realized. We have no history of a common Europe as a spiritual and intellectual entity on which we can build. We may offer extensive considerations on the cultural history of Europe, but there is hardly any common 'soul' in such a history (which has to be constructed and is not naturally apparent in the awareness of the Europeans). If there has been any European unity in the past, it has been a partial unity, restricted to areas like Western Europe or Central Europe, or it was a unity temporarily enforced by war and oppression. And even if we have any European unity created in the twentieth century, it is a unity based on coal and steel, not on common values or a shared soul.[2] There exists no deeper and shared European identity or 'soul' as a given.

If there is any, we should perhaps have to refer back to the Roman times, as does cultural philosopher Rémi Brague.[3] According to him, the European identity is a Roman or Latin one. The Romans are famous for their capacity to absorb the knowledge of other groups and cultures. The Romans did hardly invent anything themselves, but their identity is laid down in making way to what is other and strange (and the Romans did so literally by constructing roads!). In short: the European identity as Roman identity consists in the capacity to digest other traditions. It is more of a melting pot than an entity with a steady core from which inspiration and orientation may arise. If there is any identity of Europe, it is the identity of a melting or a bricolage, not the conception of an inner centre.

So, in speaking of a soul for Europe, we utter a wish about something that has never existed before. As a matter of fact, Delors expressed the wish for a soul *for* Europe; he did

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[1] I derive the quotation from http://europe-infos.eu/europeinfos/en/archive/issue163/article/5918.html (accessed: 24 June 2016). Cf. Laurens Hogebrink, *Europe's Heart and Soul. Jacques Delors' Appeal to the Churches,* Geneva 2015.
[2] Cf. the European Coal and Steel Community, established in the Treaty of Paris (1951).
[3] Rémi Brague, *Europe. La voie romaine*, Paris 1992.

not speak of a soul *of* Europe. Thus, we may as theologians conceive of a 'soul for Europe' as a theological subject or task, but we must be aware that it is not a self-evident conception and that it is a notion that is hard to envisage.

Second, we should remember that the notion of a 'soul' does not imply a first right to religion in the intellectual and spiritual debate that Delors has in mind. Looking back to his career in European politics, Delors said in an interview in 2010:

> I declared: "Europe needs to have a soul". I meant "soul" in a non-religious sense, meaning that Europe needs to know what it has been that has fundamentally brought us together through all the tragedies of our history: a certain conception of Man, of Man's relations with other men and with society. (...) In theory, it is the job of the intellectuals and the churches to look after the soul of Europe. But for me, especially after having been President of the Commission, these are fundamental questions. I did try to bring the churches together during my presidency and I was very touched by the fact that, in Germany, both on the Catholic and on the Protestant side, there was a great deal of support for this project. (...)
> In talking about the building of Europe I would make a distinction between two things: on the one hand there is the Europe of values, in which, with all due respect to those who would claim otherwise, Catholicism, or rather Christianity more generally, played a major role. The coexistence of differing religious trends lent support to the idea that antagonism and hatred should not be allowed to continue and that we should build a form of reconciliation that did not exclude recollection of past tragedies. Briefly put, Europe is, in that sense a social democratic and Christian democratic construct.[4]

This quotation makes clear that, surely, churches are invited to the debate on a soul for Europe, but that there are clearly more partners, also non-religious ones. When churches engage in the debate, they will have to establish their rights to speak, and will not receive authority beforehand. If there is an intellectual debate on the search for a soul for Europe, it is a postsecular debate: a public debate in which theology and the churches may participate, but without prior recognition of their traditions.[5]

Third, there is an interesting part in Delors' quotation, when he says that 'Catholicism, or rather Christianity more generally, played a major role'. I observe that Protestantism is not mentioned, as it is before, when Delors talks about his actual debate with European churches. Apparently, he views Roman-Catholism as the dominant actor in the development of values in Europe, while other denominations, like Protestantism, play a minor role.

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[4] Taken from an interview with the magazine *Mittelweg*, "In search of Europe. An interview with Jacques Delors", on http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-01-delors-en.html (accessed 24 June 2016).
[5] On the definition of 'postsecular': James Beckford, "Public Religions and the Postsecular. Critical Reflections (SSSR Presidential Address)", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 51/1 (2012), 1-19.

Fourth, if there is only little place for Protestantism in the history of values in Europe, even in the eyes of a president of the European Commission, I must remark that there is also no explicit place for theology in the proposed debate. The intended partners in the debate are intellectuals and the churches. If there is a role for theological reflection, it must be in supporting the churches in the debate. There is no natural place for theological institutions in this view. When theologians want to enter the discussion, they must create their own right to speak. This also is typical of the postsecular public space.

Finally, the most intriguing word in the quotations of Delors is the notion of a soul. The interview shows several ways in which the word is denoted:

> "a spirituality and meaning";
> "Europe needs to know what it has been that has fundamentally brought us together through all the tragedies of our history: a certain conception of Man, of Man's relations with other men and with society";
> "the Europe of values".

Of course, Delors' speech was not the place to provide an ample definition of the soul. I turn to the dictionary, which defines 'soul' as: 'the essential part or nature of anything' and 'a person's feeling or moral nature'.[6] Such a definition suggests that the soul is an inner characteristic of a person or thing, a given nature. But then my question is How such a conception should be awarded to the European values, which, for a large part, remain a task to be fulfilled?

I also wonder whether it is functional to use the notion of a soul for something that must be formed and educated yet. I would prefer the notion of *spirit* here, as is also implied in the notion of spirituality. Even an alternative notion like spirit, however, does not solve all my critical remarks.

2. Ricoeur on Identity: The Same, the Self, and the Other

We should beware of our reflective context. When I contribute to the task of reflecting upon a soul for Europe, I engage in this discussion as a Protestant. However, what do I mean with 'Protestant'? In other words, what is this presumed Protestant identity? Does the word Protestant imply all the ecclesial movements that engage over against the Roman Catholic church, and have arisen from Luther's reformation movement on? In this sense, we could include Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans, Methodists, Mennonites, etc. An interesting relation to the soul of Europe then arises, for these movements have all started in Europe.

However, is that a good start for a European debate on common and inspiring values, if our core identity would be established through distinction and separation from other European religious partners? Moreover, do we have to include more recent ecclesial developments under the heading of Protestantism, as the Pentecostal movement, the evangelical, and the charismatic movement? These have their origins largely outside Europe

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[6] Collins Dictionary of the English Language, s.v., London 1979, 1390.

and they derive their identity also from other roots than Protestantism. Should we, then, posit a sense of general belonging to a 'Protestant family'? Are there common identity markers in such a Protestant family? And are these markers sufficient to describe the Protestant identity? Or should we even proceed as far as Paul Tillich, by proposing a Protestant principle?[7] This would stretch the idea of a specific profile of identity to its extremes.

Rather than answering the question if such a transformation of the idea of Protestant identity is possible or fruitful, I turn to a more fundamental problem: What is identity? I will not delve into this question directly, but will rather present a philosophical reflection, inquiring into the nature of identity and considering the problems and possibilities that philosophy has seen in this notion. For this aim I draw upon the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, who offers a full-fledged reflection on identity in his book on *Oneself As Another*.[8]

This book may be interpreted as Ricoeur's retrospect on a philosophical career, devoted to the philosophical question of human being: what does it imply to be a human being? Ricoeur answers this question by defining human being as a person who is willing, who is confronted with the limits of intentional will by the experience of evil, and who develops ways of dealing with willing and evil by reflective action, language, and accountability. The hermeneutics of language and action have taught Ricoeur that personal identity should not be approached through a direct analysis of the human *cogito*, but through the reflection on human utterances, actions, and structures. Speaking of the human *self* (with a reflexive pronoun), Ricoeur expresses the importance of an indirect view on the human person, through her or his expressions, actions, and institutions, as a source for philosophical reflection on human identity.

The book adds a second insight to this primary trait of reflexivity. It is essential for Ricoeur that human identity has two aspects. On the one hand 'identity' has to do with sameness, with being identical to something or someone else. For example, I may be identified as 'male', because I have identical traits with other males. This sameness also includes permanence in time. I have an identity, because my appearance does not change completely through a time-lapse. So, identity is based upon sameness; identity has to do with being identical. On the other hand, however, identity has to do with being distinctive, with being *not* the same as another person or thing. This is the aspect of uniqueness, authenticity, or ipseity, as Ricoeur likes to call it. For him, personal identity develops in a dialectic between idem and ipse: sameness and selfhood. The main part of *Oneself As Another* is devoted to an analysis of the human self as a speaking agent, an acting agent, and as a narrator, someone who is capable of telling and mastering one's life story.

The narrative self that unfolds in such life stories, seems to form the culmination of a reflexive self in the dialectic of sameness and selfhood. Personal identity is not given in either sameness or selfhood, in *idem* or *ipse*. It is unfolded in a permanent dialectic between

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[7] Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, Chicago 1948, ch. 11.
[8] Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself As Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey, Chicago 1992; originally *Soi-même comme un autre*, Paris 1990.

the two. The notion of a narrative seems most adequate to express this time-span of the human self.

However, there is a third insight that Ricoeur wants to include in his view of personal identity. He states another dialectic, complementing the one between *idem* and *ipse*: a dialectic of *ipse* and *alter*, selfhood and otherness. In Ricoeur's view human identity reaches its full depth only when the self is capable of relating itself towards others. The challenge is not to view others as deviating in sameness: you are other, because you differ from me, but to interpret others in their alterity, as being really other than I am. The recognition of such alterity is made into a real recognition by actions of availability that convey the message: Here I am, you can count on me. And, just as the idem-ipse dialectic comes to a full profile in the narrative self, the ipse-alter dialectic ends in an ethics and politics in which firm, stable, and righteous institutions are created; a life in which living with others is consciously internalized and externalized institutionally.

> *Oneself As Another* suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms. To "as" I would like to attach a strong meaning, not only that of a comparison (oneself similar to another) but indeed that of an implication (oneself inasmuch as being other).[9]

Thus, for Ricoeur human identity is a matter of reflexivity, which leads to a view of human development through the tensions of sameness and selfhood, and the tensions of selfhood and otherness. The human self is an interpretive task, and as such a hermeneutic of the self takes a position in between the triumphant self of the Cartesian ego, which derives the nature of human being from its very act of thinking, and the shattered self of a master of suspicion like Nietzsche, who dismantled the self amidst cultural forces.

It is fruitful to apply this hermeneutic of the self to being a Protestant (though this is an intellectual exercise that Ricoeur does not perform himself, and the field of the religious has some identity questions of its own). We may admit that the Protestant identity may not be identified directly, as some essential nature of a phenomenon, but needs to be detected through stories, actions, through tradition.

We may also recognize the dialectic of idem and ipse for the Protestant identity. Protestants share some common traits, for example similar creeds, a confessional and doctrinal tradition. In describing this sameness, we come upon the ipseity of Protestants, the characteristics of the selfhood in which Protestants differ from other Christian denominations. There are differences in ecclesiology, ecclesiastical law, doctrine, spirituality, traditional awareness, etc., which make up one's specific identity of being Protestant.

There is also the dialectic of self and other. 'The other' for Protestants was traditionally the Roman-Catholic. In the present context, we might add the Eastern Orthodox believer, the Muslim, the non-believer. To what extent can we state that we include their

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[9] Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself As Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 3.

otherness into our specific selfhood: we are Protestants inasmuch as being Roman-Catholic, Muslim, agnostic... ? The reply to this question is more a task than a firm answer laid down in Protestant tradition.

4. Parfit on Identity: Identity Is Not What Matters
When we acknowledge the consequences of such a hermeneutic of the self for Protestant identity, we remove the foundation for any triumphant apologetics of Protestantism, without resolving Protestantism into other cultural and religious currents. In considering such a long, dialectical trajectory of the self, we must, however, consider another question, which is a very fundamental one: is the philosophical question (or even quest) into identity something that matters?

This question is the central subject in the work of the British philosopher Derik Parfit in his book *Reasons and Persons* (1984).[10] His book is a search for an ethics that is not based on subjective motivations and desires. Even the utilitarianist appeal to self-interest as a basis for moral reasoning is rejected by Parfit. In his opinion personal motivations like a better life (or a better after-life) should not count for moral reasoning. Parfit's approach of developing a more reasonable ethics is reductionist, in the sense that he intends to reduce subjective, personal factors in moral reasoning. This leads him in the third part of his book to a consideration of personal identity.

Parfit argues that not only subjective factors do not count in moral reasoning, but that the idea of personal identity as such should not be taken into account. When the idea of personal identity is considered, the bottom-line is that we are entities consisting of a brain and a body. Being a person means that certain experiences can be related to a certain set of brains and body. But that is, according to Parfit, everything that can be said on personal identity. There is no convincing argument to suppose the existence of more continuity than these relations between a certain set of brains and body and experiences or events: there is no moral place for the soul or other concept that exceeds the continuity of this relation.

Parfit comes to four straightforward conclusions:
1) "We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies, and various interrelated physical and mental events."
2) "It is not true that our identity is always determinate."
3) "There are two unities to be explained: the unity of consciousness at any time, and the unity of a whole life ... we can refer to these experiences, and fully describe the relations between them, without claiming that these experiences are had by a person."
4) "Personal identity is not what matters. What fundamentally matters is relation R, with any cause."[11]

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[10] Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford 1984.
[11] Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, conclusions quoted from 216-217.

I cannot elaborate on these four propositions at length.[12] Parfit argues for them in an analytic way of philosophizing in which he makes an extensive use of problematic cases of identity, for example by science-fiction like teletransportation and copying of bodies, transplantation of brains into other bodies, etc. Such examples are meant to underline his thesis that the notion of personal identity is less unequivocal in its permanence and delineation than we normally are inclined to think.

I view his argument as representing a new form of the medieval principle of parsimony, also known as Ockham's razor: among competing hypotheses, one should choose the one with the fewest assumptions. For Parfit it is essential that there is no personal identity. This aligns with his Buddhist affiliations.[13] Also the reader who doesn't have Buddhist leaning, however, might follow Parfit's reasoning that personal identity is a notion that does not fit in moral reasoning.

We should not judge that Parfit is insensitive to human suffering and evil. In some sense, we should view his impersonal reasoning as a certain sublation, *Aufhebung,* of a dialectic of personal and impersonal. After the moral situation in which personal and impersonal collide, we need another level of impersonality, the impersonality of acting from principles without diverging to personal identity.[14]

The important question now arises: If personal identity does not matter, what *does* matter? Parfit rejects the alternative of moral scepticism, and, of course, he rejects moral subjectivism. His impersonal moral reasoning should lead to a new moral criterion: how can the future be beneficent for new generations? Is that possible without filling in the identity of the new generations? Parfit is so honest as to admit that his argument as set out in *Reasons and Persons* does not provide us with a grand 'theory X' that can solve this problem.[15]

It needed some decades and a new book, the two-part voluminous *On What Matters* (2011) to answer this question.[16] Parfit now comes up with a rephrasing of the Kantian categorical imperative: 'Everyone ought to follow the optimific principles, because these are the only principles that everyone could rationally will to be universal laws.'[17]

The accentuation of personal identity leads to a valuation of the past. If identity matters, questions arise like: Has the past been worth it? Has the sum of happiness been greater than the sum of suffering? Although Parfit is inclined to answer affirmative to that question, he remains at his conviction that identity does not matter, and then his ultimate answer to the importance of the past is:

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[12] One should at least have to confront Parfit with Thomas Nagel, *The View From Nowhere*, Oxford 1986.

[13] Cf. Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 273: 'Buddha would have agreed', and 502-503.

[14] Cf. what Parfit writes at *Reasons and Persons*, 444: "Life in big cities is disturbingly impersonal. We cannot solve this problem unless we attack it in its own terms. Just as we need thieves to catch thieves, we need impersonal principles to avoid the bad effects of impersonality."

[15] Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 416, 443, 451.

[16] Derek Parfit, *On What Matters*, 2 Vols., Oxford 2011.

[17] Parfit, *On What Matters I*, 411. Optimific principles are 'principles whose being universal laws would make things go best', 410.

> (…) I also believe that, when we ask how well history has gone, these hedonic sums are not all that matter, and that the badness of uncompensated suffering cannot be easily outweighed. [18]

> Our practical question is (…) What ought we to do? To answer this question, we don't need to know either whether the past was worth it, or whether the whole of history will have been worth it.[19]

For Parfit the past really matters, insofar it has displayed people who cared for the future.

> ...of the people who have suffered in lives that were worse than nothing, many suffered in attempts to help to give humanity a good future. These people would have wanted us to try to achieve their aims, and, if we succeed, some of their suffering may not have been in vain.[20]

I remark that at this place the notion of humanity arises for Parfit. His impersonal argument in *Reasons and Persons* paved the way for a moral concern about the future. However, we cannot envisage a future without human beings. While 'person' is a moral category that cannot be hold, according to Parfit, he does need a human perspective, but then one without the many problems attached to the idea of identity. The notion of humanity must fill this perspective.

We can imagine how Parfit's way of thinking is totally opposed to the tenets of Ricoeur's philosophy. For Ricoeur identity *is* what matters. He devotes a considerable part in his *Soi-même comme un autre* to contend with Parfit.[21] Ricoeur argues that Parfit has no means to express the 'mineness' of a body, the awareness that this body is my body. This has to do with Parfit's focus on identity as sameness and permanence, the idem-identity. Parfit has no room for ipseity, but without such a conception of selfhood, one cannot adequately express our concern for the future.

Ricoeur is convinced that the idea of ipseity comes together with a sense of expropriation of the self. Such a sense is expressed in the attitude of unconcern, of which Jesus' Sermon on the Mount testifies.[22] The dialectic of ipseity and alterity adds to such an awareness. One must dispose of a certain amount of selfhood, in order to be able to make oneself available to another – that could be the shortest summary of Ricoeur's argument against Parfit.

I am inclined to go along with both thinkers. With Ricoeur, I agree that the conception of personal identity needs many transformations: from sameness to selfhood, and from selfhood to alterity. However, when the consolidation of the moral sense of

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[18] Parfit, *On What Matters II*, 612.
[19] Parfit, *On What Matters II*, 613.
[20] Parfit, *On What Matters II*, 614.
[21] Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 130-139.
[22] Matthew 6,25-34.

alterity in righteous institutions is the ultimate goal, to what extent do we need then the notion of identity? Again, I agree with Ricoeur, that the question of the human agent (who is speaking, acting, etc.) cannot be denied, and deserves full attention. However, with Parfit, I am aware of distortions in moral acting and reasoning that arise so quickly when personal identity is involved, for the view on identity easily leads to accentuating one´s own identity and prioritising one´s own interests.

Perhaps we should conclude that we are concerned with identity, but that what matters ultimately is not (our) identity, but what our identity contributes to a beneficent future for humanity. Ricoeur has not lived to experience the later developments in Parfit's thinking, but I would be anxious to know how he would respond to Parfit's positing of the notion of humanity.

4. Protestant Identity

We are concerned with identity, but that what matters ultimately is not (our) identity, but what our identity contributes to a beneficent future for humanity. Can we apply this conclusion to the identity of Protestantism and its contribution to a soul for Europe?

There are many reasons to be cautious with the idea of Protestantism. It has an aspect of idem-identity, the sameness of being united as European religious believers. It also displays ipseity, a sense of uniqueness: Protestants are distinct from, for example, Roman Catholics. This ipseity leads to further distinctions within Protestantism, for example as a Calvinist being distinct from Lutherans, Anabaptists, Free Church believers, etc. However, the processes involved in establishing this Protestant sameness and selfhood run a great risk of mystification of the past (by 'the invention of tradition'). I also fear that a transformative movement from selfhood to alterity is blocked by the accentuation of the unique character of being Protestant. It is a task of ecumenical theology to raise a more profound sense of alterity within Protestantism.

In historical theology Protestantism clearly is an entity. But does that also hold for systematic theology, as the reflection on the normative aspects of religion and beliefs? I am inclined to say that Protestantism cannot be more than an instrumental notion, directed towards what matters in our European context: the development of a soul for Europe. In as much as I am cautious in talking about the identity of Europe, which is more a task than a given, I am cautious about any Protestant identity as instrument in searching a soul for Europe. Such a modest, Protestant identity is also more of a task than a given, because there are not many instances of a successful development of Protestant identity through the dialectics of *idem* and *ipse*, and of *ipse* and *alter*.

It would be the king's highway to do without such an instrumental notion like Protestantism in systematic theology. But it is the challenge of a hermeneutical theology to search for reflection in the concrete language and acts of human beings. With this approach, the systematic theological task is to search for the elements within Protestantism that transcend the inherent tendencies of Protestantism to foster its identity.

I conceive it as a theological task to make room for a notion of Protestant identity, without any sense of proudness, which comes forth from a distorted dialectic of *idem*, *ipse*, and *alter*. This can be done by referring to the 'sola' character that is so dear to Protestantism: *sola fide, sola gratia, sola Scriptura, solus Christus*. What matters to Protestantism is not its own identity but a spiritual direction to faith, grace, Scripture, and Christ. This direction should help us to go beyond our intention to posit Protestantism itself as the one and only aim that matters.

Protestantism has a past of strife and struggle. This past should direct theology, not towards a consolidation of our Protestant identity, but to that which matters ultimately: a reality for which the Bible has coined the term Kingdom of God. Not a Protestant identity but the witness of this Kingdom matters to the formation of a soul for Europe.