

Spinoza's Ethica

A systematical presentation of the emotions (*affectus*)

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Introduction

The idea for this essay arose from the work I did on the *Glossarium* to Spinoza's works^{*}, in which I thought it useful, if only for my own better understanding, to give a systematical index to the emotions (as – following Elwes – we will call the *affectus* for want of a better term) and related terms as defined in the *Ethica*. Inspired by the work of Terry Neff[†], I conceived this index as a table, in which the relative positions of the names of the emotions reflect as much as possible their conceptual relationships.

My point of departure was the list of 48 definitions annexed to Part III of the *Ethica* (known as *Affectuum Definitiones*), which the author qualifies as “an orderly repetition of the ones given elsewhere in Part III, together with some observations” (see at the end of P. 3. prop 59. schol. ‡). Indeed, the *Ethica* contains at least two definitions of each of those emotions: one (or more!) in the text proper (usually in a *Scholium* of Part III), and one in the summary list just mentioned. In addition, one can find other terms, denoting concepts similar or related to the listed emotions that, for one reason or another, are not comprised in the summary list, or only mentioned in explanations. Even though some of them are explicitly identified by Spinoza as being of a different category: *ad corpus tantum refertur*, *passio non est*, *affectus non est* etc., there is an interest to have all of these terms collected and presented systematically, after analysis and resolution of the possible inconsistencies.

The initial assignment I gave myself, therefore, was to make the overall list as consistent and complete as possible, while basing myself exclusively on Spinoza's text, *i. e.* avoiding reference to anything outside it. The results are to be found in section 1 below. My first attempts to create a taxonomy of emotions are documented in section 2. A third section exhibits the relationships existing between the various emotions. Finally, section 4 shows the overview table.

1. The various definitions of the individual emotions

1.1. The number of (different) definitions present for each emotion

As can be seen from Table 1, most of the 48 emotions for which a precise definition is given in the *Affectuum Definitiones* at the end of Part III have a single “corresponding” definition in the text of the *Ethica* proper. In three cases (*Acquiescentia in se ipso*, *Ambitio* and *Humanitas seu Modestia*), there are three separate and different definitions or specifications. In three more cases (*Commiseratio*, *Consternatio*, and *Poenitentia*), there are two different definitions given in the text. There is only one emotion which does not really have any corresponding definition elsewhere: *Misericordia* – the additional wording found in the explanation to the definition of *Commiseratio* is in fact contributing to inconsistency.

With only a few exceptions, these corresponding definitions occur in Part III. The one for *Abiectio* is in Part IV, and one of those for *Ambitio* is in Part V, both of these are thus occurring after the summary list.

Remarkably, the occurrence of (multiple) alternative definitions is **not** correlated with the inconsistencies noted below for some of the individual emotions.

* Published on the Internet at <http://users.telenet.be/rwmeijer/spinoza/works.htm>

† Published on the Internet at <http://home.earthlink.net/~tneff/index3.htm>

‡ For the conventions used in referring to elements of the *Ethica* see <http://users.telenet.be/rwmeijer/spinoza/annex.htm>

1.2. Completeness of the set of definitions

The text of the Ethics contains a number of definitions of notions that do not recur in the *Affectuum Definitiones*, at least not in the form of a numbered definition. Table 2 below lists these notions and the corresponding formulations, which also exhibit the phenomenon of double specification in a number of cases: Verecundia, Veneratio, Dedignatio, Temperantia, Sobrietas and Clementia.

From this table (which in itself may not be complete!) one sees that there are several **named emotions** which should probably have found their place in the *Affectuum Definitiones*: this concerns first of all the pair Laus/Vituperium, and the series Hilaritas/Melancholia/Titillatio/Dolor, all of which are instances of Laetitia/Tristitia, then Verecundia, which is an instance of Timor, and Zelotypia, which is incidentally the only instance of *animi fluctuatio* mentioned explicitly. The set Veneratio/Horror/Dedignatio is defined as instances or consequences of Admiratio/Contemptus, although not entirely consistently, as noted below. Furthermore, there are two **unnamed emotions**, namely the nameless instance of Laetitia corresponding to Commiseratio and Aemulatio, and the other nameless instance of Laetitia related to Desiderium. The names suggested in Table 2 for these unnamed emotions are purely conventional and serve as reference to the definitions only. Then there are those emotions qualified as **not being *passiones***, or **governed by *ratio***, namely Animositas, Generositas, Temperantia, Sobrietas, Castitas, Animi in periculis praesentia, Honestas, Clementia, Pietas and Modestia. These will be given their appropriate place in the taxonomy. Finally there is a **named notion** which Spinoza explicitly qualifies as **not being an emotion**, namely Impudentia. The explanation/proof promised for this statement (*suo loco ostendam*) is incidentally **not** to be found in the *Ethica*. Three further notions should be mentioned here that are, at least from the meaning of the terms, opposites of ones defined under the heading of emotions, like Impudentia with respect to Verecundia: Ingratitudo (*cf.* Gratia seu Gratitude), Inhumanitas (*cf.* Humanitas) and Turpitududo (*cf.* Honestas). In P. 4. prop. 71. schol., Ingratitudo is said not to be an emotion (it characterises behaviour that can be caused by *actio*, *passio*, or the absence of either), while Inhumanitas is said of someone who is neither moved by *ratio* nor *passio* (see P. 4. prop. 50. schol.). Likewise Turpitududo is qualified as characterising behaviour rather than identifying an emotion (see P. 4. prop. 37. schol. 1.). For these reasons, none of these “negative” notions is included in the systematical presentation.

1.3. The naming of the emotions

The basis of any comparison of definitions is the identification **by name** of the defined concept. Here it can be remarked that Spinoza gives **more than one name** to the listed emotions in several cases:

- **explicitly** in the definition of Gratia seu Gratitude, Crudelitas seu Saevitia, and Humanitas seu Modestia; only in the first of these cases are both of the alternative names repeated outside the *Affectuum Definitiones*; in the second case only Crudelitas is repeated elsewhere, and in the third case each of the two different terms recurs separately in alternative definition(s), which gives rise to an inconsistency that is discussed below
- **implicitly** in the definitions of Propensio and Aversio, where the text occurrence uses a completely different terminology: Sympathia and Antipathia, as well as in the case of Acquiescentia in se ipso, where the third of the definitions given in the text proper has Philautia as an alternative term

- **perhaps unintentionally** in the definitions of Generositas and Honestas, where the formulation in the second case, which is given in Part IV, uses almost the same words as the earlier definition in Part III; this couple will be treated as synonymous

In contrast, the “quartet” of emotions defined in P. 3. prop. 23. and 24. is subsumed under a **single name**: Invidia, even though four names could have been used to distinguish them. See also the remarks below (2.1.) on Spinoza’s use of terms.

1.4. Consistency between the definitions given

Analysing the two or more definitions in each case, one finds the following:

- **full equivalence** between the various definitions; this is the case **only** for the pairs Amor/Odium and Favor/Indignatio, and for the series Luxuria/Ebrietas/Avaritia/Libido
- **small change in terminology**, *e. g.* alternation of *idea* and *imago*; this is the case in the pairs Laetitia/Tristitia, Spes/Metus, and similarly for Cupiditas, Devotio, Irrisio, Humilitas, Aemulatio, Gratia seu Gratitude, Verecundia, Temperantia, Sobrietas and Clementia
- **more or less loose paraphrase**, as in the case of the pairs Propensio/Aversio, Securitas/Desperatio, Gaudium/Conscientiae morsus, Gloria/Pudor, Audacia/Pusillanimitas and Admiratio/Contemptus; also: Commiseratio, Invidia, Acquiescentia in se ipso, Poenitentia, Benevolentia, Ira, Vindicta, Crudelitas seu Saevitia, Timor and Ambitio; sometimes this entails **loss of precision**, as exemplified by the pairs Existimatio/Despectus and Superbia/Abiectio: here the first occurring definitions can be said to be more precise, because they are given in terms of Laetitia/Tristitia; the *Affectuum Definitiones* on the other hand talk about *de aliquo/se prae amore/odio plus/minus iusto sentire* (but the *Explicatio* in each case repeats the more precise definition given earlier!)
- **inconsistency**, this is the case for Misericordia, Desiderium, Humanitas seu Modestia, Consternatio, Veneratio and Dedignatio

For the purposes of our exercise it is only the inconsistencies that should worry us, since they may make it more difficult to correctly interpret the relationships between the emotions. Concretely, the following resolutions of these inconsistencies are proposed:

- Misericordia: the comment in the explanation to the definition of Commiseratio serves to confuse rather than to enlighten; Commiseratio is unequivocally defined as an instance of Tristitia, whereas Misericordia is defined as a species of Amor, *i. e.* Laetitia; thus to say that they only differ in respect of “single emotion *vs.* general attitude” is somewhat contradictory; therefore, this comment is ignored for the purposes of classification
- Desiderium: Spinoza himself admits the inconsistency which in this case consists of considering this emotion as an instance both of Cupiditas and of Tristitia; see the explanation in the *Affectuum Definitiones*; there he also speaks of a corresponding instance of Laetitia, as described (but not given a name) in P. 3. prop. 47.; a more refined classification would have all three of these emotions suitably named and brought into relation; but since our purpose is not to redesign Spinoza’s system, but to present it conveniently, the resolution will be to make the ambiguity apparent by having a double entry for Desiderium, and using an invented name for the third emotion only

- Humanitas seu Modestia: the three alternative definitions do not consider Humanitas and Modestia as synonyms; in fact the first of these, concerned with Humanitas, is perfectly compatible with the one in the *Affectuum Definitiones*; the second one, which refers to Modestia only, as an instance of Generositas, foreshadows the definition of Modestia in its own right which is given in Part IV; in contrast, the last explanation in the *Affectuum Definitiones* identifies Modestia as an instance of Ambitio which, although related to Humanitas, represents a different shade of the desire to please; the proposed resolution is to remove Modestia as synonym for Humanitas from the definition in the *Affectuum Definitiones* altogether, and to ignore the statement about Ambitio
- Consternatio: the element of admiration is absent in the very first definition given, where the talk is of another evil instead; the proposed resolution is to ignore this definition
- Veneratio and Dedignatio: their definitions are stated in the explanation to the definitions of Admiratio/Contemptus as to be omitted, since “no emotions have their name from these”, in contradiction to the earlier defining occurrence; the proposed resolution is to ignore this comment, and to give them their place in the scheme as derived from those earlier definitions

2. Towards a taxonomy of emotions

2.1. Spinoza's own statements of intention, and use of terms

In the preface to Part III, Spinoza indicates his intention to deal with the subject of emotions as dispassionately as possible (the word is quite appropriate!), his final purpose being to determine the mind's power to restrain and moderate these emotions. He therefore accepts that he cannot attain completeness, since there are as many shades of emotion as there are objects.

Affectus itaque odii, irae, invidiae etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturae necessitate et virtute consequuntur, ac reliqua singularia; ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt, per quas intelliguntur, certasque proprietates habent, cognitione nostra aequae dignas ac proprietates cuiuscumque alterius rei cuius sola contemplatione delectamur [...] et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde, ac si quaestio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.
(P. 3. praef.)

Caeterum reliquas affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt quot obiectorum species), nec, si possem, necesse est. Nam ad id quod intendimus, nempe ad affectuum vires et mentis in eosdem potentiam determinandum, nobis sufficit, uniuscuiusque affectus generalem habere definitionem. Sufficit, inquam, nobis affectuum et mentis communes proprietates intelligere, ut determinare possimus, qualis et quanta sit mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum amoris, odii vel cupiditatis affectum, ex. gr. inter amorem erga liberos et amorem erga uxorem, nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare non est opus.
(P. 3. prop. 56. schol.)

As far as choosing names for the emotions is concerned, he is sometimes inclined to follow accepted usage, or the etymology of certain terms (see *e. g.* the explanation to *Desiderium*). On the other hand, as he indicates in several places, for the purpose of a more systematic treatment he has to deviate from accepted usage, since common naming conventions do not respect scientific criteria (see the explanation to *Favor/Indignatio*, P. 3. prop. 52. schol. and prop. 56. schol.). Also, apparently he did not find acceptable names for some of the emotions that his (admittedly incomplete) analysis indicates should exist, as was seen in 1.2. for two unnamed instances of *Laetitia*.

Quare desiderium revera tristitia est, quae laetitiae opponitur illi, quae ex absentia rei, quam odimus, oritur [...]. Sed quia nomen desiderium cupiditatem respicere videtur, ideo hunc affectum ad cupiditatis affectus refero. (P. 3. aff. defin. 32. explic.)

Haec nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est, verborum significationem, sed rerum naturam explicare, easque iis vocabulis indicare, quorum significatio, quam ex usu habent, a significatione, qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. (P. 3. aff. defin. 20. explic.)

[...] atque adeo plures affectus deducere poterimus, quam qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent. Unde apparet, affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu, quam ex eorundem accurata cognitione. (P. 3. prop. 52. schol.)

[...] affectuum nomina (ut iam monui) magis eorum usum, quam naturam respiciunt (P. 3. aff. defin. 31. explic.)

[...] hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero, nec causam video, cur id facerem [...] nec alia de causa verba de admiratione feci, quam quia usu factum est ut quidam affectus, qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad obiecta, quae admiramur, referuntur (P. 3. aff. defin. 4. explic.)

Qui id quod odio habet, tristitia affectum imaginatur, laetabitur; si contra idem laetitia affectum esse imaginatur, contristabitur (P. 3. prop. 23.) Si aliquem imaginamur laetitia afficere rem, quam odio habemus, odio etiam erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem rem afficere, amore erga ipsum afficiemur (P. 3. prop. 24.) Hi et similes odii affectus ad invidiam referuntur (P. 3. prop. 24. schol.)

2.2. Basic notions

For a useful classification of the terms obtained, one must start from the general notion of emotion itself, which is defined by Spinoza in two places: in the third definition of Part III, and in the general definition which follows the summary list at the end of Part III.

Per affectum intelligo corporis affectiones, quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, iuvatur vel coercetur, et simul harum affectionum ideas. EXPLICATIO. Si itaque alicuius harum affectionum adaequata possimus esse causa, tum per affectum actionem intelligo; alias passionem. (P. 3. defin. 3.)

Affectus, qui animi pathema dicitur, est confusa idea, qua mens maiorem vel minorem sui corporis vel alicuius eius partis existendi vim, quam antea, affirmat, et qua data ipsa mens ad hoc potius, quam ad illud cogitandum determinatur. (P. 3. aff. defin. gener.)

The first definition is more inclusive, since it encompasses *affectiones* of two kinds: the ones that we can be adequate cause of (*actio*), and the ones of which we cannot (*passio*). The *Affectuum Generalis Definitio* speaks about *animi pathema*, where *pathema* (Greek *παθημα*) must be identified with *passio*, *i. e.* it refers to the second kind of emotion only. Within the set of *passiones* Spinoza distinguishes three “primitive” emotions (in his terms: *affectus primitivi seu primarii*), namely *Cupiditas*, *Laetitia* and *Tristitia*. Many other emotions he mentions (also, as we saw earlier, outside the *Affectuum Definitiones*) are instances of these three. Conversely, there are two notions listed in the *Affectuum Definitiones* which do not clearly fit in this scheme: *Admiratio/Contemptus*, which are qualified as *mentis affectio*. In 2.1. we saw that Spinoza included these only because some other emotions are differently named when they are combined with admiration or contempt. These two should therefore not be considered as emotions in themselves.

Tres igitur (ut in schol. prop. 11. huius monui) tantum affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco, nempe laetitiae, tristitiae et cupiditatis (P. 3. aff. defin. 4. explic.) praeter hos tres nullum alium agnosco affectum primum; nam reliquos ex his tribus oriri in seqq. ostendam (P. 3. prop. 11. schol.)

In P. 3. prop. 59. schol., the notion [*animi*] *fortitudo* is introduced for *actiones, quae sequuntur ex affectibus, qui ad mentem referuntur, quatenus intelligit*. Note, by the way that the addition *animi* is in fact not found there, but in P. 4. prop. 69. where the expression *animi virtus seu fortitudo* is used. According to the beneficiary (self or other) these emotions are distinguished in *Animositas*, *Generositas* and their respective instances. Most of these instances have an “analogon” among the *passiones*. But note that such an analogon can not be an instance of *Tristitia*. In fact, the only ones that can be surmised from the text are instances of *Cupiditas*.

Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adaequatis oriuntur (P. 3. prop. 3.)

Inter omnes affectus, qui ad mentem, quatenus agit, referuntur, nulli alii sunt, quam qui ad laetitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur (P. 3. prop. 59.)

Omnes actiones, quae sequuntur ex affectibus, qui ad mentem referuntur, quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo [...] Eas itaque actiones, quae solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem, et quae alterius etiam utile intendunt, ad generositatem refero (P. 3. prop. 59. schol.)

[...] *animi virtus seu fortitudo (huius defin. vide in schol. prop. 59. P. 3.)*
(P. 4. prop. 69. demonstr.)

2.3. Other categorisations

The instances of Laetitia and Tristitia are distinguished in those that are associated with external causes (which includes incidental causes) and those that have internal causes.

Atque hi affectus laetitiae et tristitiae sunt, quos idea rei externae comitatur tamquam causa per se vel per accidens. Hinc ad alios transeo, quos idea rei internae comitatur tamquam causa (P. 3. aff. defin. 24. explic.)

One other notion is mentioned in Part IV of the Ethica, that could be used to relate emotions to each other: that of *affectus contrarii*. The only example given is Luxuria vs. Avaritia. This relationship of “contrariness” should be distinguished from the “opposition” existing between Laetitia and Tristitia, on account of which many of their instances also occur in pairs. Also among the other notions there are such obvious pairs of opposites. In all these cases, the “pairing” is apparent from the symmetrical formulation of their definitions and, sometimes, by the explicit use of *opponitur* or *opposita* in one of the definitions.

Per contrarios affectus in seqq. intelligam eos, qui hominem diversum trahunt, quamvis eiusdem sint generis, ut luxuries et avaritia, quae amoris sunt species; nec natura, sed per accidens sunt contrarii (P. 4. defin. 5.)

The notions of *affectus erga rem praeteritam, praesentem, futuram* are not very useful for categorisation purposes.

Quid per affectum erga rem futuram, praesentem et praeteritam intelligam, explicui in schol. 1. et 2. prop. 18. P. 3. (P. 4. defin. 6.)

Rem eatenus praeteritam aut futuram hic voco, quatenus ab eadem affecti fuimus aut afficiemur. Ex. gr. quatenus ipsam vidimus aut videbimus, nos refecit aut reficiet, nos laesit aut laedet etc. Quatenus enim eandem sic imaginamur, eatenus eius existentiam affirmamus, hoc est, corpus nullo affectu afficitur, qui rei existentiam secludat; atque adeo (per prop. 17. P. 2.) corpus eiusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur, ac si res ipsa praesens adesset (P. 3. prop. 18. schol. 1.)

2.4. A first attempt at taxonomy

The following list gives a hierarchical structure to the collection of emotions identified previously, in accordance with Spinoza’s definitions of terms, and the proposed resolution of inconsistencies. This list does of course not permit any non-hierarchical correspondences to be shown. These will be treated in section 3.

passiones

appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia

Cupiditas

- ***species cupiditatis***

... *re aliqua potiundi, quae eiusdem rei memoria fovetur*

Desiderium

affectuum imitatio

Aemulatio

... *benefaciendi ei, qui nos amat*

Gratia seu Gratitude

... *benefaciendi ei, cuius nos miseret*

Benevolentia

... *malum inferendi ei, quem odimus*

Ira

... *malum nobis illatum referendi*

Vindicta

... *malum inferendi ei, quem amamus, vel cuius nos miseret*

Crudelitas seu Saevitia

... *maius quod metuimus malum minore vitandi*

Timor

... *aliquid agendi cum periculo, quod aequales subire metuunt*

Audacia

... *quae coeretur timore periculi, quod aequales subire audent*

Pusillanimitas

... *ea faciendi quae hominibus placent*

Humanitas

... *idem quando impense vulgo placere conamur*

Ambitio

- ***species timoris***

... *si malum, quod timet, pudor sit*

Verecundia

... *si malum, quod timet, admiratur*

Consternatio

- ***immoderata cupiditas et amor***

... *convivandi, ... potandi*

Luxuria/Ebrietas

... *divitiarum*

Avaritia

... *in commiscendis corporibus*

Libido

transitio ad maiorem/minorem perfectionem

Laetitia/Tristitia

- ***concomitante idea causae internae***

... *concomitante idea sui tamquam causa*

Acquiescentia in se ipso/
Poenitentia

... *ex eo, quod homo suam potentiam/imbecillitatem contemplatur*

Acquiescentia in se ipso/
Humilitas

<i>ex eo, quod homo se laudari/vituperari credit</i>	Superbia/Abiectio
<i>ex eo, quod homo de se plus/minus iusto sentit</i>	Gloria/Pudor
• <i>concomitante idea causae externae</i>	
<i>generalis</i>	Amor/Odium
<i>... alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est</i>	Propensio/Aversio
<i>ex eo, quod homo de alio plus/minus iusto sentit</i>	Existimatio/Despectus
<i>... qua alterius actionem delectamur/aversamur</i>	Laus/Vituperium
<i>orta ex idea rei, de cuius eventu dubitamus</i>	Spes/Metus
<i>orta ex idea rei, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est</i>	Securitas/Desperatio
<i>orta ex idea rei praeteritae, quae praeter spem evenit</i>	Gaudium/Conscientiae morsus
<i>... ut ex bono alterius gaudeat/contristetur etc.</i>	Misericordia/Invidia
<i>orta ex destructione rei, quam odimus/absentia rei, quam amamus</i>	[Desiderio oppositum]/ Desiderium
<i>orta ex alterius bono/damno</i>	[Laetitiae imitatio]/ Commiseratio
• <i>species amoris/odii</i>	
<i>... erga aliquem, qui alteri benefecit/malefecit</i>	Favor/Indignatio
<i>amor erga eum, quem admiramur</i>	Devotio
<i>laetitia ex contemptu rei, quam odimus</i>	Irrisio
<i>animi fluctuatio concomitante idea alterius, cui invidetur</i>	Zelotypia
• <i>ad corpus potissimum referuntur</i>	
<i>omnes partes hominis pariter sunt affectae</i>	Hilaritas/Melancholia
<i>una eius pars prae reliquis est affecta</i>	Titillatio/Dolor
[<i>mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio</i>]	Admiratio/Contemptus
• <i>species admirationis/contemptus</i>	
<i>admiratio prudentiae, industriae etc.</i>	Veneratio
<i>admiratio irae, invidiae etc.</i>	Horror
<i>contemptus stultitiae</i>	Dedignatio

actiones (animi fortitudo)

solum agentis utile intendunt

- ***species animositatis***

opponitur luxuriae

opponitur ebrietati

opponitur libidini

Animositas

Temperantia

Sobrietas

Castitas

Animi in periculis praesentia

alterius etiam utile intendunt

- ***species generositatis***

cupiditas bene faciendi

cupiditas hominibus placendi

qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur

Generositas *vid. etiam*

Honestas

Pietas

Modestia

Clementia

3. The relationships between emotions

3.1. Instances of *actio* having their counterpart in a *passio*

Note that the counterpart can be an analogon, or just the opposite (example: Clementia). The latter cases are marked by a *.

basis for relationship	<i>actio</i>	<i>passio</i>
<i>cupiditas benefaciendi</i>	Pietas	Gratia seu Gratitude, Benevolentia
<i>cupiditas hominibus placendi</i>	Modestia	Humanitas Ambitio
* <i>moderatur</i>	Clementia	Ira, Vindicta
* <i>opponitur</i>		Crudelitas seu Saevitia
* <i>moderatur/opponitur</i>	Temperantia	Luxuria
* <i>moderatur/opponitur</i>	Sobrietas	Ebrietas
* <i>moderatur/opponitur</i>	Castitas	Libido

3.2. Correspondences among instances of each of the primitive emotions

corresponding element	Laetitia	Tristitia	Cupiditas
<i>appetitus rei potiundi</i>	[Desiderio oppositum]	Desiderium	Desiderium
<i>imitatio</i>	[Laetitiae imitatio]	Commiseratio	Aemulatio
<i>alterius opinio</i>	Gloria	Pudor	Humanitas, Ambitio

3.3. Corresponding emotions with internal and external causes

corresponding element	internal cause	external cause
<i>casus generalis</i>	Acquiescentia in se ipso/ Poenitentia	Amor/Odium
<i>opinio alterius/sui</i>	Gloria/Pudor	Laus/Vituperium
<i>plus/minus iusto sentire</i>	Superbia/Abiectio	Existimatio/Despectus

3.4. Opposite emotions

The emotions are presented in the order in which they occur in the hierarchical list of 2.4. Note the double occurrence of Acquiescentia in se ipso, corresponding to the fact that two of its aspects have different opposites in Spinoza's scheme.

Audacia	Pusillanimitas
Laetitia	Tristitia
Acquiescentia in se ipso	Poenitentia
Acquiescentia in se ipso	Humilitas
Superbia	Abiectio
Gloria	Pudor
Amor	Odium
Propensio	Aversio
Existimatio	Despectus
Laus	Vituperium
Spes	Metus

Securitas	Desperatio
Gaudium	Conscientiae morsus
Misericordia	Invidia
[Laetitiae imitatio]	Commiseratio
[Desiderio oppositum]	Desiderium
Favor	Indignatio
Admiratio	Contemptus

3.5. Contrary emotions

Luxuria Avaritia

4. Overview table of emotions

The table that follows attempts to incorporate both the hierarchical classification obtained in section 2 and most of the relationships from section 3. In addition, it shows the quartet of “external signs of emotion” Tremor/Livor/Singultus/Risus, which have no precise definition, and are notable only because in P. 4. prop. 45. schol. 2. there is a comparison of Risus (of which it is said there, that it is an instance of Laetitia) and Irrisio.

With some formatting conversions and adapted hyperlinks, this table is re-appearing in the *Glossarium*.

<i>affectus</i>								
<i>passio (animi pathema)</i>					<i>actio (animi fortitudo)</i>			
<i>affectus primitivus sive primarius</i>								
Laetitia		Tristitia		Cupiditas				
<i>species laetitiae</i>		<i>species tristitiae</i>		<i>species cupiditatis</i>				
[Desiderio oppositum]		Desiderium						
<i>causa interna</i>	<i>causa externa</i>	<i>causa interna</i>	<i>causa externa</i>	Generositas sive Honestas Animositas				
Acquiescentia in se ipso	Amor	Poenitentia	Odium					
		Humilitas						
Superbia	Existimatio	Abiectio	Despectus					
	Propensio		Aversio					
	Misericordia		Invidia					
	[Laetitiae imitatio]		Commiseratio				Aemulatio	
	Spes		Metus				Timor	
	Securitas		Desperatio				Audacia	Pusillanimitas
	Gaudium		Conscientiae morsus					Verecundia
	Devotio Irrisio			Consternatio		<i>species generositatis</i>		
Gloria	Laus	Pudor	Vituperium	Humanitas Ambitio		Modestia		
	Favor		Indignatio	Gratia seu Gratitude Benevolentia		Pietas		
<i>animi fluctuatio: Zelotypia</i>				Ira Vindicta	Crudelitas seu Saevitia	Clementia		

<i>ad corpus potissimum refertur</i>				<i>immoderata cupiditas et amor</i>		<i>species animositatis</i>
Hilaritas	Titillatio	Melancholia	Dolor	Avaritia	Luxuria	Temperantia
<i>corporis affectio externa</i>					Ebrietas	Sobrietas
Singultus	Risus	Livor	Tremor		Libido	Castitas
						Animi in periculis praesentia
<i>affectus non est</i>						
<i>rei singularis imaginatio</i>						
Admiratio		Contemptus				
Veneratio	Horror		Dedignatio			

Tables of definitions

Table 1. Comparative table of definitions of the emotions

Emotion	Text occurrence	Formulation	Aff. Defn.
Cupiditas	P. 3. prop. 9. schol.	<i>cupiditas est appetitus cum eiusdem conscientia; appetitus [...] nihil aliud est, quam ipsa hominis essentia, ex cuius natura ea, quae ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur; atque adeo homo ad eadem agendum determinatus est.</i>	1. <i>cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia, quatenus ex data quacumque eius affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum</i>
Laetitia	P. 3. prop. 11. schol.	<i>per laetitiam [...] intelligam passionem, qua mens ad maiorem perfectionem transit</i>	2. <i>laetitia est hominis transitio a minore ad maiorem perfectionem</i>
Tristitia	P. 3. prop. 11. schol.	<i>per tristitiam [... intelligam] passionem, qua ipsa [mens] ad minorem transit perfectionem</i>	3. <i>tristitia est hominis transitio a maiore ad minorem perfectionem</i>
Admiratio	P. 3. prop. 52. schol.	<i>haec mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio, quatenus sola in mente versatur, vocatur admiratio</i>	4. <i>admiratio est rei alicuius imaginatio, in qua mens defixa propterea manet, quia haec singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem</i>
Contemptus	P. 3. prop. 52. schol.	<i>admirationi opponitur contemptus</i>	5. <i>contemptus est rei alicuius imaginatio, quae mentem adeo parum tangit, ut ipsa mens ex rei praesentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum, quae in ipsa re non sunt, quam quae in ipsa sunt</i>
Amor	P. 3. prop. 13. schol.	<i>amor nihil aliud est, quam laetitia concomitante idea causae externae</i>	6. <i>amor est laetitia concomitante idea causae externae</i>
Odium	P. 3. prop. 13. schol.	<i>odium nihil aliud [est] quam tristitia concomitante idea causae externae</i>	7. <i>odium est tristitia concomitante idea causae externae</i>

Propensio	P. 3. prop. 15. schol. s. v. sympathia	15. <i>intelligimus, qui fieri potest, ut quaedam amemus [...] absque ulla causa nobis cognita; sed tantum ex sympathia [...]. Atque huc referenda etiam ea obiecta, quae nos laetitia [...] afficiunt ex eo solo, quod aliquid simile habent obiectis, quae nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent</i>	8. <i>propensio est laetitia concomitante idea alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est laetitiae</i>
Aversio	P. 3. prop. 15. schol. s. v. antipathia	15. <i>intelligimus, qui fieri potest, ut quaedam [...] odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita; sed tantum ex [...] antipathia. Atque huc referenda etiam ea obiecta, quae nos [...] tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo, quod aliquid simile habent obiectis, quae nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent</i>	9. <i>aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est tristitiae</i>
Devotio	P. 3. prop. 52. schol.	52. <i>si hominis, quem amamus, prudentiam, industriam etc. admiramur, amor eo ipso [...] maior erit, et hunc amorem admirationi sive venerationi iunctum devotionem vocamus</i>	10. <i>devotio est amor erga eum, quem admiramur</i>
Irrisio	P. 3. prop. 52. schol.	52. <i>irrisio ex rei, quam odimus vel metuimus, contemptu oritur</i>	11. <i>irrisio est laetitia orta ex eo, quod aliquid, quod contemnimus in re, quam odimus, inesse imaginamur</i>
Spes	P. 3. prop. 18. schol. 2.	18. <i>spes [...] nihil aliud est quam inconstans laetitia orta ex imagine rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu dubitamus</i>	12. <i>spes est inconstans laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu aliquatenus dubitamus</i>
Metus	P. 3. prop. 18. schol. 2.	18. <i>metus [...] inconstans tristitia [est] ex rei dubiae imagine [...] orta</i>	13. <i>metus est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de cuius eventu aliquatenus dubitamus</i>
Securitas	P. 3. prop. 18. schol. 2.	18. <i>securitas [...]; nempe laetitia [...] orta ex imagine rei, quam metuimus</i>	14. <i>securitas est laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est</i>

Desperatio	P. 3. prop. 18. schol. 2.	<i>desperatio; nempe [...] tristitia orta ex imagine rei, quam [...] speravimus</i>	15. <i>desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est</i>
Gaudium	P. 3. prop. 18. schol. 2.	<i>gaudium [...] est laetitia orta ex imagine rei praeteritae, de cuius eventu dubitavimus</i>	16. <i>gaudium est laetitia concomitante idea rei praeteritae, quae praeter spem evenit</i>
Conscientiae morsus	P. 3. prop. 18. schol. 2.	<i>conscientiae [...] morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio</i>	17. <i>conscientiae morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei praeteritae, quae praeter spem evenit</i>
Commiseratio	P. 3. prop. 22. schol. P. 3. prop. 27. schol. 1.	<i>commiseratio quam definire possumus quod sit tristitia orta ex alterius damno</i> <i>haec affectuum imitatio quando ad tristitiam refertur, vocatur commiseratio</i>	18. <i>commiseratio est tristitia concomitante idea mali, quod alteri, quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit</i>
Favor	P. 3. prop. 22. schol.	<i>amorem erga illum, qui alteri benefecit, favorem [...] appellabimus</i>	19. <i>favor est amor erga aliquem, qui alteri benefecit</i>
Indignatio	P. 3. prop. 22. schol.	<i>odium erga illum, qui alteri malefecit, indignationem appellabimus</i>	20. <i>indignatio est odium erga aliquem, qui alteri malefecit</i>
Existimatio	P. 3. prop. 26. schol.	<i>laetitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod homo de alio plus iusto sentit, existimatio vocatur</i>	21. <i>existimatio est de aliquo prae amore plus iusto sentire</i>
Despectus	P. 3. prop. 26. schol.	<i>illa [sc. tristitia!] [vocatur] despectus, quae ex eo oritur, quod de alio minus iusto sentit</i>	22. <i>despectus est de aliquo prae odio minus iusto sentire</i>
Invidia	P. 3. prop. 24. schol.	<i>nihil aliud est, quam ipsum odium, quatenus id consideratur hominem ita disponere, ut malo alterius gaudeat, et contra ut eiusdem bono contristetur</i>	23. <i>invidia est odium, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut ex alterius felicitate contristetur, et contra ut ex alterius malo gaudeat</i>
Misericordia	P. 3. aff. defin. 18. explic.	<i>inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia, nisi forte, quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem eius habitum</i>	24. <i>misericordia est amor, quatenus hominem ita afficit, ut ex bono alterius gaudeat, et contra ut ex alterius malo contristetur</i>

Acquiescentia in se ipso	P. 3. prop. 30. schol.	<i>laetitiam concomitante idea causae internae acquiescentiam in se ipso [...] vocabo</i>	25. <i>acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur</i>
	P. 3. prop. 51. schol.	<i>acquiescentia in se ipso est laetitia concomitante idea sui tamquam causa</i>	
	P. 3. prop. 55. schol. 1.	<i>laetitia [...] quae ex contemplatione nostri oritur, philautia vel acquiescentia in se ipso vocatur</i>	
Humilitas	P. 3. prop. 55. schol. 1.	<i>tristitia concomitante idea nostrae imbecillitatis humilitas appellatur</i>	26. <i>humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo, quod homo suam impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur</i>
Poenitentia	P. 3. prop. 30. schol.	<i>tristitiam [...] [concomitante idea causae internae] poenitentiam vocabo</i>	27. <i>poenitentia est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius facti, quod nos ex libero mentis decreto fecisse credimus</i>
	P. 3. prop. 51. schol.	<i>poenitentia est tristitia concomitante idea sui [tamquam causa]</i>	
Superbia	P. 3. prop. 26. schol.	<i>est igitur superbia laetitia ex eo orta, quod homo de se plus iusto sentit</i>	28. <i>superbia est de se prae amore sui plus iusto sentire</i>
Abiectio	P. 4. prop. 57. schol.	<i>abiectio [...] definienda esset tristitia orta ex falsa opinione, quod homo se infra reliquos esse credit</i>	29. <i>abiectio est de se prae tristitia minus iusto sentire</i>
Gloria	P. 3. prop. 30. schol.	<i>laetitiam concomitante idea causae internae gloriam [...] appellabimus; intellige, quando laetitia [...] ex eo oritur, quod homo se laudari [...] credit</i>	30. <i>gloria est laetitia concomitante idea alicuius nostrae actionis, quam alios laudare imaginamur</i>
Pudor	P. 3. prop. 30. schol.	<i>tristitiam [concomitante idea causae internae] pudorem appellabimus; intellige, quando [...] tristitia ex eo oritur, quod homo se [...] vituperari credit</i>	31. <i>pudor est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius nostrae actionis, quam alios vituperare imaginamur</i>

Desiderium	P. 3. prop. 36. schol.	<i>tristitia, quatenus absentiam eius, quod amamus, respicit, desiderium vocatur</i>	32. <i>desiderium est cupiditas sive appetitus re aliqua potiundi, quae eiusdem rei memoria fovetur, et simul aliarum rerum memoria, quae eiusdem rei appetendae existentiam secludunt, coercetur</i>
Aemulatio	P. 3. prop. 27. schol. 1.	<i>haec affectuum imitatio ad cupiditatem relata [vocatur] aemulatio, quae [...] nihil aliud est, quam alicuius rei cupiditas, quae in nobis ingeneratur ex eo, quod alios nobis similes eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur</i>	33. <i>aemulatio est alicuius rei cupiditas, quae nobis ingeneratur ex eo, quod alios eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur</i>
Gratia seu Gratitude	P. 3. prop. 41. schol. 1.	<i>conatus benefaciendi ei, qui nos amat, quique [...] nobis benefacere conatur, gratia seu gratitudo vocatur</i>	34. <i>gratia seu gratitudo est cupiditas seu amoris studium, quo ei benefacere conamur, qui in nos pari amoris affectu beneficium contulit</i>
Benevolentia	P. 3. prop. 27. schol. 2.	<i>voluntas sive appetitus benefaciendi qui ex eo oritur, quod rei, in quam beneficium conferre volumus, nos miseret, benevolentia vocatur</i>	35. <i>benevolentia est cupiditas benefaciendi ei, cuius nos miseret</i>
Ira	P. 3. prop. 40. schol. 2.	<i>conatus malum inferendi ei, quem odimus, ira vocatur</i>	36. <i>ira est cupiditas, qua ex odio incitatur ad illi quem odimus malum inferendum</i>
Vindicta	P. 3. prop. 40. schol. 2.	<i>conatus [...] malum nobis illatum referendi vindicta appellatur</i>	37. <i>vindicta est cupiditas, qua ex reciproco odio concitatur ad malum inferendum ei, qui nobis pari affectu damnum intulit</i>
Crudelitas seu Saevitia	P. 3. prop. 41. schol. 2.	<i>qui ab eo, quem odio habet, se amari imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur; quod si odium praevaluerit, ei, a quo amatur, malum inferre conabitur, qui quidem affectus crudelitas appellatur, praecipue si illum, qui amat, nullam odii communem causam praebuisse creditur</i>	38. <i>crudelitas seu saevitia est cupiditas, qua aliquis concitatur ad malum inferendum ei, quem amamus, vel cuius nos miseret</i>

Timor	P. 3. prop. 39. schol.	<i>timor [...] nihil aliud est quam metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum, quod futurum iudicat, minore vitandum</i>	39. <i>timor est cupiditas maius quod metuimus malum minore vitandi</i>
Audacia	P. 3. prop. 51. schol.	<i>si [...] ad hoc attendam, quod eius cupiditas malum inferendi ei quem odit, et benefaciendi ei quem amat, non coercetur timore mali, a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum audacem appellabo</i>	40. <i>audacia est cupiditas, qua aliquis incitatur ad aliquid agendum cum periculo, quod eius aequales subire metuunt</i>
Pusillanimitas	P. 3. prop. 51. schol.	<i>si [...] ad hoc attendam, quod eius cupiditas coercetur timore mali, quod me continere nequit, ipsum pusillanimum esse dicam</i>	41. <i>pusillanimitas dicitur de eo, cuius cupiditas coercetur timore periculi, quod eius aequales subire audent</i>
Consternatio	P. 3. prop. 39. schol.	<i>si cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur timore alterius mali, ita ut quid potius velit nesciat, tum metus vocatur consternatio</i>	42. <i>consternatio dicitur de eo, cuius cupiditas malum vitandi coercetur admiratione mali, quod timet</i>
	P. 3. prop. 52. schol.	<i>haec mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio, quatenus sola in mente versatur, [...] si ab obiecto, quod timemus, moveatur, consternatio dicitur</i>	
Humanitas seu Modestia	P. 3. prop. 29. schol.	<i>conatus aliquid agendi et etiam omittendi, ea sola de causa, ut hominibus placeamus, [vocatur ambitio praesertim quando ... ;] alias humanitas appellari solet</i>	43. <i>humanitas seu modestia est cupiditas ea faciendi quae hominibus placent, et omittendi quae displicent</i>
	P. 3. prop. 59. schol.	<i>modestia [...] species generositatis [est]</i>	
	P. 3. aff. defin. 48. explic.	<i>modestia species est ambitionis</i>	

Ambitio	P. 3. prop. 29. schol.	<i>conatus aliquid agendi et etiam omittendi, ea sola de causa, ut hominibus placeamus, vocatur ambitio praesertim quando adeo impense vulgo placere conamur, ut cum nostro aut alterius damno quaedam agamus vel omittamus</i>	44. <i>ambitio est immodica gloriae cupiditas</i>
	P. 3. prop. 56. schol.	<i>per [...] ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus, quam [...] gloriae immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem</i>	
	P. 5. prop. 4. schol.	<i>unusquisque appetat, ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant [...]; qui quidem appetitus in homine, qui ratione non ducitur, passio est, quae ambitio vocatur</i>	
Luxuria	P. 3. prop. 56. schol.	<i>per luxuriam [...] nihil aliud intelligimus, quam convivandi [...] immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem</i>	45. <i>luxuria est immoderata convivandi cupiditas vel etiam amor</i>
Ebrietas	P. 3. prop. 56. schol.	<i>per [...] ebrietatem [...] nihil aliud intelligimus, quam [...] potandi [...] immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem</i>	46. <i>ebrietas est immoderata potandi cupiditas et amor</i>
Avaritia	P. 3. prop. 56. schol.	<i>per [...] avaritiam [...] nihil aliud intelligimus, quam [...] divitiarum [...] immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem</i>	47. <i>avaritia est immoderata divitiarum cupiditas et amor</i>
Libido	P. 3. prop. 56. schol.	<i>per [...] libidinem [...] nihil aliud intelligimus, quam [...] coeundi [...] immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem</i>	48. <i>libido est etiam cupiditas et amor in commiscendis corporibus</i>

Table 2. Definitions of related notions

Notion	Reference	Formulation
Hilaritas	P. 3. prop. 11. schol.	<i>affectum laetitiae ad mentem et corpus simul relatum [...] hilaritatem voco [...]. Sed notandum, [...] hilaritatem [ad hominem referri], quando omnes [sc. eius partes] pariter sunt affectae</i>
	P. 3. aff. defin. 3. explic.	<i>definitiones hilaritatis [...] omitto, quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt species</i>
Melancholia	P. 3. prop. 11. schol.	<i>affectum [...] tristitiae [ad mentem et corpus simul relatum] [...] melancholiam [voco]. Sed notandum, [...] melancholiam [ad hominem referri], quando omnes [sc. eius partes] pariter sunt affectae</i>
	P. 3. aff. defin. 3. explic.	<i>definitiones [...] melancholiae [...] omitto, quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt species</i>
Titillatio	P. 3. prop. 11. schol.	<i>affectum laetitiae ad mentem et corpus simul relatum titillationem [...] voco [...]. Sed notandum, titillationem [...] ad hominem referri, quando una eius pars prae reliquis est affecta</i>
	P. 3. aff. defin. 3. explic.	<i>definitiones [...] titillationis [...] omitto, quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt species</i>
Dolor	P. 3. prop. 11. schol.	<i>affectum [...] tristitiae [ad mentem et corpus simul relatum] dolorem [...] [voco]. Sed notandum, [...] dolorem ad hominem referri, quando una eius pars prae reliquis est affecta</i>
	P. 3. aff. defin. 3. explic.	<i>definitiones [...] doloris omitto, quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi laetitiae aut tristitiae sunt species</i>
[Laetitiae imitatio]	P. 3. prop. 22. schol.	<i>quo autem nomine appellanda sit laetitia, quae ex alterius bono oritur, nescio</i>
Laus	P. 3. prop. 29. schol.	<i>laetitiam, qua alterius actionem, qua nos conatus est delectari, imaginamur, laudem voco</i>
Vituperium	P. 3. prop. 29. schol.	<i>tristitiam [...] qua [...] eiusdem actionem aversamur, vituperium voco</i>
Zelotypia	P. 3. prop. 35. schol.	<i>nihil aliud est, quam animi fluctuatio orta ex amore et odio simul, concomitante idea alterius, cui invidetur</i>
Verecundia	P. 3. prop. 39. schol.	<i>si malum, quod timet, pudor sit, tum timor appellatur verecundia</i>
	P. 3. aff. defin. 31. explic.	<i>[est] verecundia [...] metus seu timor pudoris, quo homo continetur, ne aliquid turpe committat</i>
[Desiderio oppositum]	P. 3. prop. 47.	<i>laetitia, quae ex eo oritur, quod scilicet rem, quam odimus, destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur</i>

Veneratio	P. 3. prop. 52. schol.	<i>si id, quod admiramur, sit hominis alicuius prudentia, industria vel aliquid huiusmodi, quia eo ipso hominem nobis longe antecellere contemplamur, tum admiratio vocatur veneratio</i>
	P. 3. aff. defin. 5. explic.	<i>definitiones venerationis [...] missas hic facio, quia nulli, quod sciam, affectus ex his nomen trahunt</i>
Horror	P. 3. prop. 52. schol.	<i>alias [admiratio vocatur] horror si hominis iram, invidiam etc. admiramur</i>
Dedignatio	P. 3. prop. 52. schol.	<i>dedignatio ex stultitiae contemptu [oritur]</i>
	P. 3. aff. defin. 5. explic.	<i>definitiones [...] dedignationis missas hic facio, quia nulli, quod sciam, affectus ex his nomen trahunt</i>
Castitas	P. 3. prop. 56. schol.	<i>castitas, quam libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu [passio] non [est]; sed animi [indicat] potentiam, quae hos affectus moderatur</i>
Animositas	P. 3. prop. 59. schol.	<i>per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem, qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare [...] eas itaque actiones, quae solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem [...] refero</i>
Temperantia	P. 3. prop. 59. schol.	<i>temperantia [...] animositatis [est] species</i>
	P. 3. prop. 56. schol.	<i>temperantia, quam luxuriae [...] opponere solemus, affectus seu [passio] non [est]; sed animi [indicat] potentiam, quae hos affectus moderatur</i>
Sobrietas	P. 3. prop. 59. schol.	<i>sobrietas [...] animositatis [est] species</i>
	P. 3. prop. 56. schol.	<i>sobrietas, quam ebrietati [...] opponere solemus, affectus seu [passio] non [est]; sed animi [indicat] potentiam, quae hos affectus moderatur</i>
Animi in periculis praesentia	P. 3. prop. 59. schol.	<i>animi in periculis praesentia [...] animositatis [est] species</i>
Generositas	P. 3. prop. 59. schol.	<i>per generositatem [...] cupiditatem intelligo, qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines iuvare et sibi amicitia iungere [...] eas itaque actiones, [...] quae alterius etiam utile intendunt, ad generositatem refero</i>
Clementia	P. 3. prop. 59. schol.	<i>clementia [...] species generositatis [est]</i>
	P. 3. aff. defin. 38. explic.	<i>crudelitati opponitur clementia, quae passio non est, sed animi potentia, qua homo iram et vindictam moderatur</i>
Impudentia	P. 3. aff. defin. 31. explic.	<i>verecundiae opponi solet impudentia, quae revera affectus non est, ut suo loco ostendam</i>

Pietas	P. 4. prop. 37. schol. 1.	<i>cupiditatem [...] bene faciendi, quae eo ingeneratur, quod ex rationis ductu vivimus, pietatem voco</i>
Honestas	P. 4. prop. 37. schol. 1.	<i>cupiditatem [...] qua homo, qui ex ductu rationis vivit, tenetur ut reliquos sibi amicitia iungat, honestatem voco</i>
Turpitude	P. 4. prop. 37. schol. 1.	<i>id [...] turpe [voco], quod conciliandae amicitiae repugnat</i>
Inhumanitas	P. 4. prop. 50. schol.	<i>qui nec ratione, nec commiseratione movetur, ut aliis auxilio sit, is recte inhumanus appellatur</i>
Ingratitudo	P. 4. prop. 71. schol.	<i>porro ingratitude affectus non est. Est tamen ingratitude turpis, quia plerumque hominem nimio odio, ira vel superbia vel avaritia etc. affectum esse indicat</i>
Modestia	P. 4. app. cap. 25.	<i>modestia, hoc est, cupiditas hominibus placendi, quae ex ratione determinatur, ad pietatem [...] refertur</i>